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ABSTRACT 
 
The Risk of Divorce and Household Saving Behavior 
 
We analyze the impact of an increase in the risk of divorce on the saving behaviour of 
married couples. From a theoretical perspective, the expected sign of the effect is 
ambiguous. We take advantage of the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996 as an 
exogenous increase in the likelihood of marital dissolution. We analyze the saving behaviour 
over time of couples who were married before the law was passed. We propose a difference-
in-differences approach where we use as comparison groups either married couples in other 
European countries (not affected by the law change), or Irish families who did not experience 
a significant increase in the expected risk of divorce (such as very religious families, or single 
individuals). Our results suggest that the increase in the risk of divorce brought about by the 
law was followed by an increase in the propensity to save of married couples, consistent with 
a rise in precautionary savings interpretation. An increase in the risk of marital dissolution of 
about 40 percent led to a 7 to 13 percent rise in the proportion of married couples reporting 
positive savings. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to test empirically the effect of an increase in marital instability on the 
saving behavior of married individuals. Previous theoretical studies have not been able to 
unambiguously sign this effect, due to conflicting channels at work. We use the 
legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996 as an exogenous shock to the risk of divorce. 
We propose several comparison groups (unaffected by the law change) that allow us to 
use a difference-in-differences approach. Our findings suggest that the legalization of 
divorce led to an increase in the propensity to save by married individuals, which is 
consistent with individuals rising their precautionary savings as a response to the increase 
in the probability of a negative income shock. 
  Previous studies have looked into changes in the economic behavior of 
households as a response to a higher risk of divorce. The most common outcome of 
interest has been the labor supply behavior of the households, especially the female 
spouse (Johnson and Skinner 1986, Parkman 1992, Papps 2006, Stevenson 2008). Other 
outcomes that have received some attention are the degree of specialization within the 
marriage (Lundberg and Rose 1999), the division of labor between the spouses 
(Lommerund 1989), and the investment in marriage-specific capital (Stevenson 2007). 
The findings suggest that an increase in the risk of divorce may lead to increases in labor 
supply (especially among women) and a decline in marriage-specific investments. 
A popular empirical strategy in the most recent studies is to exploit the variation 
across US states in the introduction of unilateral divorce legislation. However, recent 
research suggests that the effect of unilateral legislation on divorce rates may have been 
limited in the long term (Wolfers 2006), which raises the question of how much unilateral 
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divorce effectively affected the perceived risk of marital separation. At the same time, 
European countries have in recent decades undergone much broader reforms in their 
divorce legislation, and some countries have even legalized divorce fairly recently, such 
as Spain in 1981 or Ireland in 1996, resulting in significant increases in divorce rates 
(González & Viitanen 2008). We thus exploit the recent legalization of divorce in Ireland 
in the view that it provides a stronger shock to the risk of divorce than the legal reforms 
previously exploited in the literature. 
 The determinants of the saving behavior of individuals and households has long 
been the subject of study by economists, but we are still far from reaching full 
understanding of the factors that drive consumption and saving decisions.1 The standard 
stylized models of saving do not account explicitly for life-changing events such as 
marriage and divorce, which have potentially relevant and long-lasting implications on 
income and consumption. This is regrettable given the high levels of marital instability 
reached in Western countries over the past few decades,2 which may well have had a 
significant impact on saving rates. 
 Some recent theoretical work has made an attempt to introduce marriage and 
divorce explicitly in a model of savings,3 stressing different channels through which 
marital transitions can affect consumption and savings. None of them, however, provide 
an unambiguous prediction regarding the effect of increasing marital instability on the 
saving behaviour of married couples. 
                                                 
1
 An example is the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the source of the drastic fall in saving rates 
in the US since the 1980’s (Browning & Lusardi, 1996). 
2
 The divorce rate peaked in the US in the early 1980’s at about 5 annual divorces per 1,000 people, and in 
the UK in the late 1980’s/early 1990’s at about 3. 
3
 Cubbedu & Ríos-Rull (1997), Lupton and Smith (2003), Browning, Chiappori & Weiss (2004), Guner & 
Knowles (2004), Aura (2007).  
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    Divorce is generally viewed as a costly event (lawyer fees, etc). Moreover, the 
economies of scale associated with marriage are lost upon marital dissolution. Therefore, 
an increase in the perceived risk of divorce would be viewed by the married individual as 
an increase in the probability of experiencing a negative shock, which is expected to lead 
to an increase in precautionary savings, similar to the effect of an increase in labor 
income risk (Cubbedu & Ríos-Rull 1997). 
 However, a divorce also implies that the common assets of the couple must be 
split between the partners. Uncertainty regarding the sharing rule (i.e. how much of the 
couple’s joint savings each partner will get to keep) implies that an increase in the 
likelihood of divorce makes saving while married more risky, thus creating incentives to 
increase current consumption.4  
 There are additional channels that can also lead to a negative relationship between 
the risk of marital instability and savings, for instance if divorce involves fees that reduce 
the net worth and thus the return to saving of the couple, or if divorce is potentially 
followed by remarriage, which implies that individual assets will have to be shared with 
the new partner (Cubbedu & Ríos-Rull 1997). 
 Overall, the expected effect of an increase in the risk of divorce on the saving 
behaviour of the spouses is ambiguous, thus the need for empirical work to test which of 
the channels dominates in practice. To our knowledge, we provide the first empirical test 
for the effect of the increase in the risk of marital instability on the saving behavior of 
married couples. In order to do so, we take advantage of an exogenous increase in the risk 
of marital dissolution generated by the recent legalization of divorce in Ireland, and 
                                                 
4
 Aura’s theoretical model (Aura 2007) focuses on the effects of different aspects of the divorce legislation 
on the spouses’ incentives to save. 
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follow a difference-in-differences approach to identify its effect on households’ 
propensity to save. 
 Using both macro and individual-level data, we find that the saving rate increased 
in Ireland after 1996 relative to other European countries. This increase was particularly 
pronounced among married individuals, and even more so for non-religious marriages, 
relative to religious ones. We interpret the evidence as consistent with an increase in 
precautionary saving by married individuals in response to an increase in the risk of 
divorce. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data 
and the methodology. First we provide support for our identifying assumption that the 
Irish divorce law of 1996 led to an increase in the perceived risk of marital dissolution. 
We then propose several alternative control groups and provide some support for the 
claim that, while they were subject to similar economic conditions, they did not 
experience an increase in the perceived risk of divorce as a result of the law change. Next 
we introduce the econometric specification and we discuss the measures of saving 
behaviour available in the data. Section 3 discusses the results when using the alternative 
control groups, and section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 The Irish divorce law and the risk of marital dissolution 
We propose to identify the effect of an increase in the risk of marital dissolution by 
taking advantage of the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996, which was followed by 
a rapid increase in divorce rates.  
 5 
 The Irish Constitution of 1937 banned the dissolution of marriage.5 After frequent 
debates over the issue, a referendum was called in November 1995, and the ban on 
divorce was lifted after the “Yes” prevailed by a very narrow margin (50.28% of the 
vote).6 The removal of the ban was subsequently incorporated in the Constitution in June 
1996, and the new divorce law became effective in February 1997.  
 The new law dictated that a divorce could be granted only after the partners had 
been separated during four out of the previous five years. The Irish courts were granted a 
great deal of discretion regarding the economic consequences of divorce for the spouses. 
The law states the factors to be taken into consideration, including the contributions made 
by the two spouses (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary), but there is no explicit policy of 
equal division of assets.7 
 The legalization of divorce was followed by a rapid increase in the number of 
divorce applications filed as well as the number of divorces granted over the following 
years. Figure 1 displays the number of divorces granted between 1996 and 2004. In 1998, 
the second year after the law came into effect, about 1,500 divorces were granted. By 
2004, more than 3,000 new divorces were granted annually. 
 Of course, it is possible that the new divorce law was merely allowing previously 
separated couples to provide legal burial to their already broken marriage. Our claim, 
however, is that the legalization of divorce in fact increased marital dissolution rates. In 
1994-1995, only 1.78% of Irish adults aged 18 to 65 reported being separated or divorced 
                                                 
5
 Judicial separation was posible since 1989. 
6
 We take this as an indication that there were no clear expectations that the referendum would lead to a 
removal of the ban. Moreover, a similar referendum in 1986 failed to gain enough support for the “Yes”. In 
that sense, the legalization of divorce was not anticipated.  
7
 The law does mention the responsibility of both (ex-) spouses to maintain one another, even after the 
divorce. The calculation of actual maintenance payments is up for the courts to decide, and it should be 
based on the financial resources and needs of the spouses (Boele-Woelki, 2003). 
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(Living in Ireland Survey). In 1997-2001, this figure had jumped to a significantly higher 
2.66%.8 The next subsection provides additional evidence that certain subgroups of the 
population experienced substantial increases in the probability of separation or divorce 
following the 1996 law.  
 
2.2 Finding a control group 
In order to identify the effect of the increase in the risk of marital dissolution generated 
by the legalization of divorce, we would like to find a source of variation in that increase 
in risk across the population.  
 Our first approach is to identify a subgroup of the Irish population that we can 
plausibly expect would be less affected by the legalization of divorce. One possibility is 
to use religiosity as a source of variation. It may be plausible to think that very Catholic 
families would be “less affected” by the legalization of divorce, given that the Catholic 
church bans marital dissolution.  
Table 1 shows the percentages of the adult population that reported being 
separated or divorced by religiosity, both pre (1994-95) and post (1997-2001) the 
legalization of divorce. Individuals are classified as religious if they report attending 
religious services at least once a week.9 Before 1996, non-religious individuals were 
significantly more likely to be separated than religious ones (3.1% versus 1.2%). This 
difference remains after 1996 (4.3 versus 1.6%). 
                                                 
8
 The increase was from 3.45 to 4.33% for the ever-married adult population (also statistically significant). 
9
 Studies in the Economics of Religion typically use as measures of religiosity at the individual level either 
church attendance or self-reported religiosity (answers to the question “How religious are you?”), see 
Iannaccone’s 1998 survey. Our main dataset does not ask about religiosity directly. However, the 2002 
EES survey for Ireland asks about both church attendance and self-reported religiosity (on a scale from 0 to 
10). Among those who report not being religious (values 0, 1 or 2), only 3.4% report attending church at 
least once a week, while the percentage is 82.1% among those who report being very religious (8, 9 or 10). 
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Moreover, religious individuals did not experience a significant change in their 
separation and divorce rate after 1996. However, the separation and divorce rate among 
non-religious adults increased significantly, from 3.06% before 1996 to 4.28% after (a 40 
percent increase).10 We conclude that it is plausible to claim that legalizing divorce 
affected non-religious families differentially, increasing their risk of marital breakup, 
relative to religious ones. 
 The additional identifying assumption required is that the saving behavior of 
religious and non-religious families would have followed similar trends over time, in the 
absence of the law change. Figure 3 provides some support for this assumption by 
showing that the trends in several indicators of saving behavior were similar for both 
groups in the years preceding the legalization of divorce.11 
 One could also think that single individuals would be less affected by the increase 
in divorce rates relative to married ones. Thus, we also use singles as a comparison 
group, expecting their saving behavior to be less influenced by the increase in marital 
instability. 
 It is of course hard to claim that either religious families or singles in Ireland were 
completely unaffected by the legalization of divorce.12 Thus we propose an alternative 
control group, composed of individuals in other European countries where divorce was 
already legal and no changes in the regulation of divorce took place during the 1990’s. 
Although families in other European countries were certainly not affected by the Irish 
                                                 
10
 This is even stronger if we look at separation and divorce rates among ever-married adults. While this 
rate remained stable at 2.3% among religious individuals, it increased significantly from 5.7 to 7.9% for 
non-religious ones. 
11
 See section 2.4 for the definition of these saving indicators. 
12
 In that sense, our estimates when using religious families or singles as a control group can be seen as 
lower bounds on the effect of interest.  
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divorce law, we need to find countries that were plausibly under similar economic 
conditions during the relevant period. This is not easy given that Ireland experienced an 
unprecedented period of economic growth during the 1990’s. 
 The two EU-15 countries with more similar economic conditions to Ireland 
during the period appear to be the UK and Spain. In all three countries, GDP growth 
slowed down in 1990 and 1991, and then surged up, remaining at a higher level until 
2000. That level, however, was about 8% for Ireland, compared with 4% for Spain and 
the UK. As for unemployment rates, they increased in the three countries until 1993-94, 
falling steadily since then, with the levels much higher in Spain than in Ireland or the UK. 
Figure 2 also shows that private sector savings as a percentage of GDP attained similar 
levels in the three countries in the early 1990’s (about 18% in 1992), reaching a peak in 
1994-95 and then declining slowly.  
 Although there are some differences in macroeconomic performance across the 
three countries, we feel the trends are similar enough to allow for the use of Spain and the 
UK as alternative control groups. For robustness, we also perform the analysis including 
additional European countries as controls. 
 The international comparison of saving behavior over time is carried out both 
using aggregate, macro data on saving rates as a percentage of GDP, and using 
individual-level, micro data for the different countries, which allows us to focus on the 
behavior of the married population as well as to include individual-level controls.   
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2.3 Econometric specification, data and sample 
We estimate different versions of the following standard difference-in-differences 
specification: 
  
 
Where S is a measure of the saving behavior (see next subsection for the specific 
variables used) of an individual (or household, or country) i in group j (treated or control) 
and year t. The function F will depend on the specification (linear, probit and logit 
models are estimated). T is an indicator for individuals belonging in the treatment group, 
while Post takes value 1 for all years after divorce was legalized in Ireland. An 
interaction between T and Post is also included, and X stands for a set of control 
variables that are thought to affect savings.13 
The coefficient β1 measures the average difference in saving behavior between 
the treated and the control group, while β2 captures the overall change in saving behavior 
after the reform. The key parameter is β3, which indicates the change in the saving 
behavior of treated individuals after the reform, relative to the control group. 
We estimate three sets of specifications. In the first set, we use aggregate data on 
saving rates as percent of GDP by country. The “treated group” in these regressions is 
Ireland, while other countries serve as control group. The data on national saving rates 
are obtained from OECD and Eurostat publicly available figures. 
A second set of specifications uses micro-level data for Ireland from the Living in 
Ireland Survey, a longitudinal household survey that covers the period 1994-2001. The 
                                                 
13
 Some specifications use more than one control group, in which cases the necessary additional dummy 
variables and interaction terms are included. 
)( '321 ijtijttjtjijt XPostTPostTFS εγβββα +++++=
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treated group in these specifications is composed of non-religious marriages, and the 
comparison group includes religious marriages and/or single individuals. A couple is 
defined as “religious” if both partners report going to church at least once a week in their 
first interview, typically in 1994.14   
The main sample in these specifications is composed of married individuals. In 
order to avoid potential selection into marriage effects (since the legalization of divorce 
may well affect the incentives to marry), we exclude couples whose marriages took place 
in 1996 or later. In order to avoid selection due to separation or divorce, we also exclude 
all individuals that are observed getting separated or divorced at any point during the 
survey. Thus our married sample is in practice composed only of “stable marriages that 
started before 1996”. We include individuals of all ages up to 65, in order to exclude 
retired individuals, whose saving behavior is expected to be different. Our pre-reform 
years are 1994 to 1996, while the post-reform period spans 1997-2001. The sample size is 
about 2,800 married couples in the Irish sample. Some additional specifications include 
singles as a control group. We define “singles” as individuals aged 18 to 65 who were 
never married in all the survey interviews. 
Finally, a third set of specifications includes individual-level data for Ireland, 
Spain and the UK. This multi-country, individual-level data set merges the Living in 
Ireland sample with the Spain and UK samples from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP is a longitudinal survey spanning 1994 through 
2001 and covering all EU-15 countries.15  
                                                 
14
 We explore different variations in the definition of “religious marriages”, as we report in the robustness 
checks section (3.4). 
15
 Unfortunately, the ECHP does not include information on religiosity or church attendance. 
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In this final set of regressions, the treatment group is defined as married Irish 
individuals, the controls being married individuals in Spain and the UK. Additional 
specifications use non-religious married Irish couples as the treated group (thus religious 
married couples in Ireland serve as an extra comparison group). We also run 
specifications where we include singles as an additional control group. The married and 
single samples, as well as religiosity, are defined as before.   
 
2.4 Saving measures 
The aggregate specifications use national saving rates as a percentage of GDP as the 
dependent variable. There are three measures of national savings available: gross national 
saving, private sector saving, and household saving. Unfortunately, household saving 
rates are not available for Ireland before 1996. Thus, we perform our macro-level 
analysis with both national saving and private sector saving rates. Figure 2 displays 
private sector saving rates for Ireland, Spain and the UK between 1991 and 2001. 
As for the individual-level analysis, the literature has typically measured savings 
either as current income minus consumption, or as changes in wealth holdings over time. 
Both measures are deemed to be very noisy as well as subject to substantial measurement 
error. Our micro data sources, however, lack good measures of either consumption or 
wealth. They do, however, include a range of indicators of saving behavior, both at the 
household and the individual level. We thus use a set of binary variables that we think 
capture the propensity to save of households and individuals, but we cannot attempt to 
construct continuous measures of saving rates. 
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 The appendix reports the exact definition of all the variables used to construct our 
saving indicators. The household-level variables include two alternative measures of 
whether a household saves a positive fraction of their income. One is derived from the 
answers to whether the household is “able to save” (“Save2”), while the other is derived 
from a more detailed question that asks whether, considering the household’s income and 
expenses, at the end of the month there is money left that the household members can 
save (“Save”). A third household-level saving indicator measures negative savings by 
indicating households that are currently repaying debt other than mortgage payments or 
credit card debt (“Debt”).  
Descriptive statistics for the household-level measures of savings are shown in 
table 3 (panel a). The two binary indicators of positive household savings show 
significant differences in levels, suggesting the phrasing of the question may have an 
effect on reporting. For instance, in the pre-reform period, 50% of non-religious 
households report being “able to save”, but only 32% report that there is usually money 
left at the end of the month that household members can save.  
 At the individual level, we use a binary indicator constructed from a question that 
asks whether an individual’s savings, in the bank or other financial institutions, have 
increased over the previous 12 months (“Savings increase”). This variable is closer to the 
standard definition of saving and is phrased more precisely. Summary statistics for this 
variable can be found in table 3 (panel b). Before the reform, about 21% of all individuals 
in the sample reported an increase in their savings over the previous year. 
We also report the results for some additional dependent variables that we think 
may be indicative of saving-related behavior. For instance, a household may increase 
 13 
savings by reducing the consumption of goods or services in the market by producing 
them at home. We thus create a binary indicator takes value 1 if the household reports 
significant savings (more than 1,000 pounds a year) derived from do-it-yourself repairs or 
other home production activities (“DIY savings”).  
One may also think of housing wealth as a source of savings. We thus include an 
indicator of house ownership (as well as one for second-house ownership) as additional 
dependent variables. There are also other durables that may be thought of as wealth, thus 
we also run specifications for car ownership. Descriptive statistics for these additional 
dependent variables can be found in table 3 (panel a).  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Aggregate multi-country analysis 
The evolution of the private saving rate as a percentage of GDP in Ireland, Spain and the 
UK between 1991 and 2001 can be found in Figure 2. This period covers 5 years before 
and 5 years after the legalization of divorce in Ireland. In the mid-1990’s, all three 
countries had private saving rates around 20% of GDP.  
We estimate simple diff-in-diff specifications where the dependent variable is the 
log of the private saving rate, and report the results in table 2 (columns 1 to 3). The first 
column includes only the UK as a control country, while the second adds Spain and the 
third also includes France and Germany.  
On average, private savings declined after 1996 for the three sets of countries. 
However, relative to the control countries, private savings increased significantly in 
Ireland after 1996. The size of this (relative) increase was about 20% relative to the UK, 
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down to 13% when including Spain as an additional control, and 10% when adding 
Germany and France.16     
A longer time series is available for the aggregate national saving rate, running 
from 1988 to 2007. The results of specifications that use the log of this measure of saving 
rates as a dependent variable are reported in columns 4 through 7. The results show that 
the Irish saving rate increased after 1996 by 30% relative to the UK (col. 4). The size of 
the estimated effect remains almost unchanged when we include additional control 
countries: Spain (col. 5), France and Germany (col. 6), and finally also Italy and Portugal 
(col. 7). The estimated effects are strongly significant.17 
Thus, we find that the saving rate in Ireland increased significantly after 1996, 
and this increase was significantly higher than that experienced by other European 
countries (where in fact saving rates were stable or declining). The next subsections will 
provide some evidence that this relative increase in saving rates may have had something 
to do with the 1996 legalization of divorce.   
 
3.2 Religious families as control group 
Descriptives 
Table 3 (panel a) shows some descriptive statistics for the Irish household sample, 
separately for religious and non-religious households, and for the pre and post-reform 
years. Religious households are defined as those where both partners report going to 
                                                 
16
 We also run specifications that include a linear time trend, but the trend is never significant at the 10% 
level and its inclusion barely changes the magnitude of the estimated effects. 
17
 We also run aggregate saving rates specifications for the restricted 1991-2001 period. The results are 
similar to those in cols. 1-3, with estimated effects of .203, .200 and .222, respectively, all strongly 
significant. Including linear trends in all specifications does not significantly alter the results, and the trend 
is typically not significant. 
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church at least once a week in the first interview, thus the religiosity indicator is time-
invariant for a given family. 
 Note that non-religious households are younger than religious ones (by about 5 
years on average), have slightly lower income, and slightly smaller household size (due 
to slightly smaller number of children). Thus it will be important to control for these 
factors. 
 Note also that non-religious families are less likely to save and more likely to be 
in debt than religious ones. Before the reform, 55% of religious families reported positive 
savings, compared with 50% of non-religious ones. After 1996, the proportion of 
households that reported positive savings increased for both treatment and control groups. 
 The descriptives for the individual sample are reported in table 3 (panel b). The 
proportion of all individuals that reported an increase in their savings over the previous 
year was between 21 and 22 percent before the reform in both groups. Again, treated 
individuals are younger, have lower income and smaller household sizes than the control 
group. After 1996, the proportion reporting that their savings were increasing rose for 
both groups. 
 Figures 3.a through 3.d show the year-by-year evolution of the four main 
individual-level measures of saving behavior for religious and non-religious marriages 
(and singles). Both indicators of positive household savings were higher for religious 
families before 1996, and both display a positive trend for both groups over the whole 
period. However, after 1996 it appears that the increase is steeper among non-religious 
marriages. The proportion of households in debt appears to peak in 1997 for all three 
groups, declining subsequently. Finally, the proportion of individuals reporting increases 
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in their savings evolves very similarly for all groups until 1997, but from then on non-
religious married individuals are more likely to increase their savings than religious 
marriages and singles. The next section reports the results of a more formal regression 
analysis. 
Regression Results 
The main regression results for the household sample are reported in tables 4 and 5, while 
table 6 shows the results for the individual sample. Table 4 focuses on the binary 
dependent variable “Save”. Results are reported for several different specifications. 
Columns 1 through 5 include only the married sample. The first specification is linear 
and includes no control variables, thus the results can be interpreted as pure differences in 
means, straight from figure 3.a. Married households were significantly more likely to 
save after 1996, while religious families saved more than non-religious ones. After 1996, 
non-religious families increased their propensity to save by almost 5 percentage points, 
relative to non-religious ones.  
 Column 2 includes age, age squared and age cubed as controls, with no 
substantial changes in the main coefficients. Then a full set of controls is added (col. 3), 
including educational attainment dummies (for the husband), a linear time trend, log 
household size and log household income (coefficients not reported). Some of these 
variables, however, could be determined endogenously, which calls for some caution 
when interpreting these results. More educated and higher-income households are 
significantly more likely to save, while larger families are less likely to. The time trend is 
not significant, and neither is age once all the other controls are included. The effect of 
interest is now estimated at almost 6 percentage points.     
 17 
 Column 4 reports the marginal effects from a Probit specification that includes the 
more plausibly exogenous controls (age and education). The estimated effect remains at 6 
percentage points. Finally, column 5 includes household fixed-effects. Even then, the 
estimated effect is a significant 4 percentage points. 
 The last specification includes singles as an additional control group.18 The results 
show that non-religious married couples were 3 percentage points more likely to save 
after 1996, relative to both religious marriages and singles. 
 Table 5 reports the coefficients on the interaction term between “Post” and “Non-
religious” for the remaining household-level dependent variables and several different 
specifications. Each row reports the results for a different outcome variable. The results 
go in the same direction as those in table 4. The second indicator of a household’s 
propensity to save (“Save2”) increased by 3 to 4 percentage points more for treated 
relative to control families after divorce was legalized. We also find that non-religious 
families were significantly less likely to be in debt after the reform, relative to religious 
ones (and singles), by 3 to 6 percentage points. 
 Regressions are also estimated for the indicator of “do-it-yourself” related 
savings, as well as for house and car ownership. We find that after 1996, non-religious 
marriages were more likely to report “do-it-yourself” related savings and were more 
likely to own a house and a car, relative to the control groups. We find no effect on 
second-house ownership. 
 Table 6 reports the results for the individual measure of saving behavior, “Savings 
increase”. We report the results for specifications that include both men and women, but 
we also ran separate specifications for husbands versus wives. The control variables show 
                                                 
18
 Note that we do not separate singles by religiosity. 
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the same patterns as in the household-level specifications (coefficients not reported). 
Older, more educated individuals are more likely to report savings increases. Females are 
significantly less likely to report increases in their savings than men. Individuals in non-
religious households are less likely to report increases in their savings, especially men. 
The overall propensity to save increased significantly after 1996.  
Non-religious individuals were significantly more likely to report increases in 
their savings after 1996, relative to religious ones as well as singles, by 2 to 4 percentage 
points. The size of the effect is not significantly different for men and women. 
One may also be interested in the timing of the estimated effects. We run 
additional specifications where we interact non-religious marriages with each single year 
after 1996, instead of with a single post-reform indicator. The results for the three main 
measures of saving behavior are reported in Table 7, for the fixed-effects specification. 
The coefficient estimates suggest that the effects increase over time for the three 
outcomes. In 1997, the effects are essentially zero, becoming positive but small in 1998 
(and still not significantly different from zero). The estimated effects become significant 
in 1999, and they increase in magnitude in 2000 and 2001.  
In sum, we find that married households in Ireland were more likely to save after 
1996, and this increase was significantly higher among non-religious families. Non-
religious households were also less likely to incur in debt relative to religious married 
households and singles. Also, individuals were significantly more likely to report that 
their savings had increased over the previous year after 1996, and this increase was 
higher for non-religious individuals. The results suggest that non-religious married 
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individuals in Ireland became more likely to save (relative to religious ones as well as 
singles) after 1996, the time when divorce was legalized. 
 
3.3 Individual-level, multi-country analysis 
Descriptives 
Table 8 shows some summary statistics for the three-country sample, separately for 
Ireland, Spain and the UK and for the pre and post-reform periods. Before the reform, 
saving rates were much higher in the UK than in Ireland or Spain (68% compared with 
33-35%). Before 1997, saving rates were increasing both in Ireland and in Spain, 
although the increase was steeper in Spain. The proportion of households in debt before 
the reform was lowest in Spain. 
 The age profile is similar in the three countries, while income levels (expressed in 
euros) were similar in the UK and Ireland but significantly lower in Spain. Household 
size was highest in Ireland. After 1996, the propensity to save increased in all three 
countries, while the proportion of households in debt remained essentially flat. 
Regression Results 
The regression results for the three-country sample are reported in tables 9 and 10. The 
control variables show similar patterns as in the Irish sample. Higher education is 
associated with a higher propensity to save and a lower likelihood of being in debt, while 
the age profile has low significance levels.  
 After 1996, the propensity to save of married couples increased in Ireland by 
about 4 percentage points, relative to the UK and Spain, and this effect was significant 
(table 8, cols. 1 and 2). In fact, this effect is mostly driven by the comparison to the UK. 
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When including only the UK as a control country, the estimated effect is a significant 9 
percentage points, while it is only a less significant 2 points relative to Spain (not shown). 
 Columns 3 and 4 show the results when using non-religious Irish couples as the 
treated group. Since the ECHP does not include the church attendance variable, we 
cannot separate couples by religiosity in the UK and Spain. These specifications also 
include an indicator for Ireland interacted with non-religious (not reported). The results 
show that married couples were more likely to save in Ireland after 1996 relative to the 
other countries, but this increase was more pronounced among non-religious households. 
The estimated effect is between 4 and 5 percentage points. 
 Finally, the last two columns show the results when including singles as an 
additional control group.19 These regressions now include a dummy for married 
interacted with each country, plus an indicator for married interacted with post-1996 
(common for all countries), the interaction between Ireland and non-religious marriages, 
and the quadruple interaction of Ireland, married, non-religious and post. The results 
show that married individuals save more than singles in all three countries (not reported), 
while savings increased overall after 1996, and significantly more for married individuals 
relative to singles (not reported). We also find that the increase in the propensity to save 
was significantly more pronounced in Ireland (by 7 percentage points). Moreover, non-
religious married individuals in Ireland increased their propensity to save more than 
religious couples and singles in Ireland, relative to the other countries, by about 4 
percentage points. 
Table 10 shows the results for the remaining dependent variables. The first two 
columns include only married couples and do not separate by religiosity, while columns 3 
                                                 
19
 Note that singles are not broken down by religiosity. 
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and 4 include singles and also break down Irish married couples by religiosity. Focusing 
on the most complete specification in column 4, we find that non-religious marriages in 
Ireland were less likely to be in debt after 1996, relative to the control group of singles 
and religious couples in Ireland as well as married and single households in the UK and 
Spain. We also find a positive effect on the likelihood of owning a house and a car. 
 
3.4 Additional specifications and robustness checks 
We have estimated a number of alternative specifications as robustness checks. All 
individual-level regressions have been estimated using a probit, a logit and a linear 
probability model, with no significant differences. Moreover, we estimate specifications 
with and without individual fixed effects. The inclusion of the individual fixed effects 
affects the coefficients of interest surprisingly little, and typically does not alter the 
significance level.  
 We have also explored some variations in the sample selection and the control 
variables included. For instance, we have selected the sample based on the age of the 
husband or on the age of the wife, and have included as a control the age of the husband, 
the age of the wife or both at once. These variations made little difference in the results. 
We also tried including additional control variables, such as the aggregate unemployment 
rate instead of a time trend, which barely affected the main coefficients. 
Perhaps more relevant were the specifications that used alternative definitions of 
religiosity. Our main definition of “untreated” household includes couples where both 
husband and wife report going to church at least once a week in the first interview (66% 
of the married sample). A more strict definition would include couples where both report 
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going to church more than once a week, but that would account for only about 5% of the 
sample. A less strict definition would include couples where at least one of them goes to 
church once a week, but this would include almost 99% of married households. Finally, 
we could classify as religious couples those where both report going to church at least 
once a month (76% of the sample). Using this less strict definition barely alters the 
magnitude of the estimated effects, which become slightly stronger for some of the 
dependent variables, as would be expected.20   
 We also experimented with different clustering strategies in the individual-level 
specifications, to account for the fact that the relevant variation is over time and by group 
(treated versus control). Allowing the residuals to be correlated within year and group 
reduces the significance of the estimated effects, as expected.  
 The main specification excludes couples who end up divorcing or separating by 
2001. When we estimate specifications that include the separating couples, the effect 
typically gets stronger; indicating that those households adjust their saving behavior 
(while still married) more than the couples who do not break up, as would be expected. 
However, we observe few separations in the data, which may explain why the size of the 
coefficient only changes slightly.  
 The baseline results include all years between 1994 and 2001, but we also try 
dropping years 1996 and 1997, the “reform years”. This weakens the estimated effects 
slightly, but they remain mostly significant. 
                                                 
20
 Other definitions that we have tried use multiple interviews for each household (as in “both spouses go to 
church at least once a week in all interviews”), or use different thresholds for each spouse (as in “the 
husband goes to church at least once a week and the wife goes more than once a week”). These resulted in 
small changes in the “treated” sample but did not affect the results substantially. 
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Finally, when using families in other countries as comparison groups, we 
explored using only Spain and only the UK as control countries.21 The estimated effect 
was smaller and less significant when using only Spain as a control country.22 
 
4. Conclusions 
We have shown that the propensity to save increased significantly in Ireland after 1996, 
relative to other European countries. This increase was significantly higher among non-
religious married couples, compared with religious ones, and also relative to unmarried 
individuals.  
One possible reason for this increase in the propensity to save of Irish married 
individuals is the legalization of divorce that took place in 1996, which increased the risk 
of marital breakup, especially for non-religious families. These results are consistent with 
married individuals increasing their precautionary savings in anticipation of a potential 
divorce. 
We estimate that an increase in the risk of marital separation of about 40% led to 
a significant rise in the proportion of married households reporting positive savings (of 7-
8% or 10-13%, depending on the saving indicator used). Married couples became 10 to 
13% less likely to be in debt, and were about 17% more likely to report that their overall 
savings had increased over the previous year.  
This suggests that divorce legislation may affect not only marital breakup rates 
and the income of individuals directly affected by a divorce, but also the economic 
                                                 
21
 We also explored using all other EU15 countries as controls. 
22
 Regression results for all the alternative specifications in this section are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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behavior of individuals who stay married, who may adjust to the change in the risk of 
future marital separation. Previous studies have suggested that one channel of adjustment 
is likely to be labor supply, and we provide evidence that saving behavior may also adjust 
significantly. The increase in savings can of course take place both directly through 
changes in consumption, or indirectly through increases in labor supply that in turn 
increase household income. 
In order to tease out these channels, we have also estimated parallel specifications 
where the dependent variables are labor supply and household income. The results 
suggest that both men and women increased their labor supply significantly following the 
legalization of divorce, with increases in employment of 4 to 8 percent. This resulted in 
an average increase in household income of about 3 percent.23 
Some caveats of our analysis are worth mentioning. First, in our individual-level 
analysis we are only able to use binary indicators of saving activity, thus cannot draw 
conclusions about changes in the individual saving rate as a proportion of household 
income. Second, we lack a true control group within Ireland, thus our analysis uses 
alternative “comparison groups”, but the results may understate the true effect if the 
comparison group is also partially affected by the legal change. And third, we only have 
access to few pre-reform years, and are thus unable to control for long-term pre-reform 
trends, which would strengthen our identification strategy. Although we have performed 
a number of robustness checks, these caveats suggest that the results should be 
interpreted with caution, and further studies are required to confirm their robustness. 
 
 
                                                 
23
 More detailed regression results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Appendix. Variable Definition  
A. Living in Ireland Survey 
 
1) ZH37 Save (Household File)  
When you consider your household's usual income on the one hand and its expenses on 
the other would you say that there is usually some money left which household members 
can save?  
                 Yes .................................. 1 
No (or very little).............. …………2 
 
2) ZH28_37 Save2 (Household File) 
Here is a list of things which a person might have or be able to do. [Int. Show Card HB] 
Could you tell me which of the things listed you have or can avail of? 
- Able to save? 
Yes.................................. 1 
No................................... 2 
 
3) ZH29 Debt (Household File) 
Do you or anyone in your household currently have to repay debts from hire purchases or 
any other loans, apart from any mortgage or loan connected with the house and apart 
from outstanding credit card debts? 
Yes .................................. 1 
No ................................... 2 
Missing…….……………9 
 
4) Z2J64 Savings increase (Individual File) 
I would like you to consider, in general, all the savings you have (both in your own name 
and jointly with other household members) in the Bank, Building Society, Post Office, 
Credit Union, Savings Bank or in Savings Certificates, Savings Bonds or Prize Bonds. 
How does your TOTAL balance in all these savings today compare with what it was 12 
months ago? Would you say, in general, that it … [Waves 2-8 only] 
Increased a Lot ............................1 
Increased a Little..........................2 
Remained the Same.....................3 
Fell a Little...................................4 
Fell a Lot .....................................5 
Missing …………………………9 
 
5) (ZH46_1+ ZH46_2+ ZH46_3) DIY savings (Household File) 
Would you say that any of the following results in a significant saving (of say IR£1,000 
or more each year) in your household’s expenditure … 
ZH46_1 … Consuming food you produce on your own farm or garden Yes/ No 
ZH46_2 … Consuming goods from your business (other than farming) Yes/ No 
ZH46_3 … Saving money by carrying out any form of home production, repairs, 
maintenance, all forms of DIY etc. Yes/No 
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6) ZH11 House ownership (Household File) 
Does your household own this dwelling or are you a tenant or sub-tenant? If you own, or 
are purchasing, please say whether the purchase was through a local authority or with a 
private mortgage (or no mortgage). 
Owner (or purchasing) – not Local Authority………1 
Owner (or purchasing) – Local Authority…………..2 
Accommodation provided rent-free…………………3 
Tenant/subtenant……………………………………4 
 
7) ZH28_9 Car (Household File) 
Here is a list of things which a person might have or be able to do. [Int. Show Card HB] 
Could you tell me which of the things listed you have or can avail of? 
- Has car? 
Yes.................................. 1 
No................................... 2 
 
8) ZH28_49 Second house (Household File)  
Here is a list of things which a person might have or be able to do. [Int. Show Card HB] 
Could you tell me which of the things listed you have or can avail of? 
- Has second home? 
Yes.................................. 1 
No................................... 2 
 
B. European Community Household Panel 
1) HF013 Save (Household file) 
Is there normally some money left to save (considering household’s income and 
expenses) 
Yes………………….1 
No or very little……..2 
 
2) HF001 Debt (Household file) 
(Repay Debts Other than Mortgage) 
Does anybody in the household presently have to repay debts from hire purchase or 
loans, etc., not connected with the house? To what extent is this a burden on the 
household? 
Yes, repayment a heavy burden…………………………………..1 
Yes, repayment somewhat a burden………………………………2 
Yes, repayment not a problem…………………………………….3 
Yes, repayment, but whether a burden or not is unknown………..4 
No, does not have to repay………………………………………..5 
 
3) HA023 House (Household File) 
(Tenure Status) 
Does your household own this dwelling or do you rent it? 
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Owner……………………………………………..1 
Tenant/subtenant, paying rent……………………..2 
Accommodation is provided rent-free…………….3 
Not applicable…………………………………….-8 
Missing……………………………………………-9 
 
4) HB001 Car (Household File) 
Possession of a car or van (for private use): 
Yes……………………………1 
No- cannot afford……………..2 
No- other reason………………3 
No- reason unknown………….4 
Not applicable………………..-8 
Missing………………………-9 
 
5) HB007 House2 (Householf File) 
Possession of a second home (e.g. for vacation): 
Yes……………………………1 
No- cannot afford……………..2 
No- other reason………………3 
No- reason unknown………….4 
Not applicable………………..-8 
Missing………………………-9 
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Figure 1. Annual number of divorces granted, Ireland 1996-2004 
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Figure 2. Gross Private Sector Saving as % of GDP, Ireland, Spain and UK, 1991-2001 
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Source: European Commission Report (2000) "European Economy: Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines-Convergence Report for Single Currency" Statistical Anex, 
Table 48. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
Figure 3. Individual-level Saving Measures, Ireland 1994-2001 
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3.b) Save2 
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3.c) Debt 
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Married, religious Married, non-religious Single
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
3.d) Savings Increase 
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Table 1. Separation and divorce rates by religiosity, Ireland 1994-2001 
  1994-95   1997-2001   Difference   
Religious 1.181   1.552   0.371   
 (0.108)  (0.124)   (0.164)  
         
Nonreligious 3.059  4.278   1.219 ** 
  (0.172)   (0.202)   (0.265)   
         
Difference 1.878 ** 2.726 ** 0.848 ** 
  (0.203)   (0.237)   (0.312)   
 
Note: The main body of the table show the percentage of the population aged 18 to 65 
(by religiosity) who reported being either separated or divorced in each time period. 
"Religious" is defined as "attends church at least once a week". Two asterisks indicate 
99% significance. 
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Table 2. Aggregate saving sate results 
 
  Log Private Saving Rate Log Aggregate National Saving Rate 
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
Post-1996 -0.1729 *** -0.1018 ** -0.0703 *** -0.0004  0.0241  -0.0003  -0.057 
 
*** 
 (0.0551)  (0.0405)  (0.0229)  (0.0390)  (0.0234)  (0.0166)  (0.0197)  
Ireland*Post-
1996 0.2003 ** 0.1292 * 0.0976 * 0.3009 *** 0.2763 *** 0.3007 *** 0.3574 *** 
 (0.0779)  (0.0701)  (0.0513)  (0.0552)  (0.0408)  (0.0377)  (0.0530)  
               
N 22  33  55  38  58  98  138  
Years 1991-2001 1988-2007 
Control 
countries UK   
UK, 
Spain   
UK, Spain, 
Germany, France UK   UK, Spain   
UK, Spain, 
Germany, France 
UK, Spain, Germany, 
France, Italy, Portugal 
 
Note: All regressions include individual country dummies. 
Source: Eurostat for private saving rates, OECD for aggregate saving rates. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics, Irish married sample (Living in Ireland Survey). 
 
3.a) Household-level variables 
 
  Religious Nonreligious 
  
Pre (1994-
1996) 
Post (1997-
2001) 
Pre (1994-
1996) 
Post (1997-
2001) 
Save 0.3406 0.4477 0.3169 0.4708 
Save2 0.5526 0.7182 0.4975 0.6919 
Debt 0.3575 0.3880 0.4433 0.4208 
DIY savings 0.4286 0.2623 0.3851 0.2551 
House 0.9423 0.9504 0.8249 0.8572 
Car 0.9231 0.9554 0.8144 0.9008 
2nd house 0.0681 0.1106 0.0692 0.0966 
     
Age of husband 47.90 49.91 42.07 44.97 
Univ. Degree 0.133 0.144 0.200 0.201 
Hh income (pounds per 
week) 418.55 576.42 399.24 565.54 
Hh size 4.55 4.38 4.30 4.37 
     
N 3952 4376 2010 2630 
 
3.b) Individual-level variables 
 
  Religious Nonreligious 
  
Pre (1995-
1996) 
Post (1997-
2001) 
Pre (1995-
1996) 
Post (1997-
2001) 
Savings increase 0.2140 0.2786 0.2208 0.3077 
     
Age 47.35 49.33 41.44 44.32 
Univ. Degree 0.122 0.128 0.178 0.188 
Hh income (pounds per 
week) 431.96 570.04 411.17 568.32 
Hh size 4.48 4.31 4.30 4.35 
     
N 4985 9274 2486 4771 
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Table 4. Regression results, Irish household sample, dependent variable “Save” 
 
  1   2   3   4   5   6   
Post-1996 0.1071 *** 0.1071 *** -0.0039  0.0994 *** 0.0999 *** 0.1085 *** 
 (0.0107)  (0.0107)  (0.0167)  (0.0109)  (0.0096)  (0.0060)  
Non-religious -0.0237 * -0.0258 * -0.047 *** -0.0418 ***     
 (0.0133)  (0.0136)  (0.0124)  (0.0142)      
Non-rel.*Post 0.0468 *** 0.0499 *** 0.0567 *** 0.0599 *** 0.0398 ** 0.0312 ** 
 (0.0182)  (0.0182)  (0.0165)  (0.0193)  (0.0163)  (0.0145)  
             
Control group 
Religious 
marriages 
Religious 
marriages 
Religious 
marriages 
Religious 
marriages Religious marriages 
Rel. marriages and 
singles 
Control 
variables None  
Age, age 
squared, age 
cubed All  
Age and 
education None  None  
Specification Linear  Linear  Linear  Probit (m.e.) 
Linear, indiv. fixed-
effects 
Linear, indiv. fixed-
effects 
N 12698   12698   12675   12698   12698   29759   
 
Note: The married sample includes all couples married before 1996 and never separated or divorced. The singles sample includes all 
never married individuals who do not change marital status. Marginal effects reported in the Probit specification. One asterisk 
indicates a 90% confidence level, two indicate 95%, and three indicate 99%. "All" controls in col. 3 include age, age squared, age 
cubed, four educational attainment dummies, a linear time trend, log household size and log household income. 
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Table 5. Regression results, Irish household sample, 6 dependent variables 
 
  1   2   3   4   
Save2 0.0312 * 0.0395 ** 0.0266  0.0325 ** 
 (0.0182)  (0.0158)  (0.0164)  (0.0142)  
Debt -0.05 *** -0.0594 *** -0.0258 * -0.0434 *** 
 (0.0179)  (0.0174)  (0.0154)  (0.0151)  
DIY savings 0.029  0.0561 *** 0.0241  0.0414 *** 
 (0.0182)  (0.0172)  (0.0155)  (0.0149)  
House 0.0036  0.0224 *** 0.0033  0.044 *** 
 (0.0074)  (0.0052)  (0.0096)  (0.0062)  
Car 0.0111  0.0487 *** 0.0272 *** 0.0487 *** 
 (0.0074)  (0.0072)  (0.0097)  (0.0078)  
2nd house -0.0137  -0.009  -0.007  0.0007  
 (0.0093)  (0.0098)  (0.0082)  (0.0083)  
         
Control 
group 
Religious 
marriages 
Religious 
marriages 
Rel. marriages 
and singles 
Rel. marriages and 
singles 
Control 
variables 
Age and 
education None  
Age and 
education None  
Specification Probit (m.e.) LPM w. f-e  Probit (m.e.) LPM w. f-e  
N 12698   12698   29759   29759   
 
Note: The coefficients reported correspond to the interaction between “post-1996” and 
“treated” (nonreligious) in cols. 1 and 2, and “post-1996”, “married” and “nonreligious” 
for cols. 3 and 4. The married sample includes all couples married before 1996 and never 
separated or divorced. The singles sample includes all never married individuals who do 
not change marital status. Marginal effects reported in the Probit specifications. Also 
included in the regressions are the separate dummies for “post-1996” and “treated”, and a 
dummy for “single” in specifications 3 and 4. One asterisk indicates a 90% confidence 
level, two indicate 95%, and three indicate 99%.  
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Table 6. Regression results, Irish individual sample, dependent variable “Savings 
increase” 
 
    1   2   3   
Post-1996  0.0635 *** 0.0653 *** 0.0651 *** 
  (0.0076)  (0.0078)  (0.0059)  
Non-
religious  -0.0041      
  (0.0114)      
Non-
rel.*Post  0.0245 * 0.0368 *** 0.0370 *** 
  (0.0140)  (0.0135)  (0.0126)  
        
Control 
group 
 
Religious 
marriages Religious marriages 
Rel. marriages and 
singles 
Control variables 
Sex, age and 
educ. None  None  
Specification  Probit (m.e.) 
Linear, indiv. fixed-
effects 
Linear, indiv. fixed-
effects 
N   21516   21516   35775   
 
Note: The married sample includes all individuals married before 1996 and never 
separated or divorced. The singles sample includes all never married individuals who do 
not change marital status. Marginal effects reported in the Probit specification. One 
asterisk indicates a 90% confidence level, two indicate 95%, and three indicate 99%.  
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Table 7. Regression results over time, Irish married sample, 1994-2001 
 
  Save   Save2   
Savings 
Increase   
Nonrel.*1997 -0.0288  -0.0137  -0.0039  
 (0.0212)  (0.0206)  (0.0168)  
Nonrel.*1998 0.0125  0.0186  0.0203  
 (0.0223)  (0.0216)  (0.0176)  
Nonrel.*1999 0.0453 * 0.0587 ** 0.0780 *** 
 (0.0239)  (0.0232)  (0.0188)  
Nonrel*2000 0.1216 *** 0.0877 *** 0.0506 *** 
 (0.0247)  (0.0240)  (0.0193)  
Nonrel*2001 0.1694 *** 0.1329 *** 0.0977 *** 
 (0.0255)  (0.0248)  (0.0199)  
       
Control group 
Religious 
marriages 
Religious 
marriages 
Religious 
marriages 
Control 
variables None  None  None  
Specification 
Linear, indiv. 
fixed-effects  
Linear, indiv. 
fixed-effects  
Linear, indiv. 
fixed-effects  
N 12698   12698   21516   
 
Note: The sample includes all individuals married before 1996 and never separated or 
divorced. One asterisk indicates a 90% confidence level, two indicate 95%, and three 
indicate 99%.  
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Table 8. Summary statistics, three-country married sample 
 
  Ireland   Spain   UK 
  Pre Post   Pre Post   Pre Post 
Save 0.3326 0.4558  0.3469 0.4621  0.6820 0.7214 
Debt 0.3864 0.3995  0.2601 0.2599  0.3999 0.3759 
House 0.9027 0.9178  0.8255 0.8762  0.8409 0.8580 
Car 0.8864 0.9363  0.8678 0.9052  0.9272 0.9520 
2nd house 0.0684 0.1057  0.1826 0.2037  0.1101 0.0987 
         
Age 45.94 48.18  46.02 47.55  44.93 47.29 
Univ. Degree 0.155 0.164  0.177 0.191  0.388 0.506 
Hh income 
(euros) 25381 33557  16637 20241  25149 38498 
Hh size 4.43 4.38  3.93 3.95  3.32 3.38 
         
N 5962 6736   11387 12380   4739 6688 
 
Source: Living in Ireland Survey for Ireland, ECHP for the UK and Spain. 
Note: The sample includes all individuals married before 1996, younger than 65 and 
never separated or divorced. 
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Table 9. Regression results, three-country sample, dependent variable “Save” 
 
  1   2   3   4   5   6   
Post-1996 0.0814 *** 0.0693 *** 0.0816 *** 0.0693 *** 0.0422 *** 0.0431 *** 
 (0.0051)  (0.0045)  (0.0051)  (0.0045)  (0.0048)  (0.0047)  
Ireland*Post 0.0402 *** 0.0443 *** 0.0232 ** 0.0306 *** 0.0767 *** 0.0717 *** 
 (0.0098)  (0.0094)  (0.0115)  (0.0111)  (0.0088)  (0.0094)  
Ireland*Post*Nonrel.     0.0505 *** 0.0398 **     
     (0.0176)  (0.0172)      
Ireland*Post*Nonrel.*Married         0.048 *** 0.0398 ** 
         (0.0178)  (0.0174)  
             
Control group Married couples in UK and Spain 
Non-rel. mar. in Ireland, married in UK 
and Spain 
Non-rel. mar. in Ireland, married in UK and 
Spain, singles in Ire., UK and Sp. 
Control variables 
Age and 
education None  
Age and 
education None  
Age and 
education None  
Specification Linear  
Linear, indiv. 
fixed-effects Linear  
Linear, indiv. 
fixed-effects Linear  
Linear, indiv. 
fixed-effects 
N 47892   47892   47892   47892   106636   106636   
 
Note: The married sample includes all couples married before 1996 and never separated or divorced in Spain, the UK and Ireland. The 
singles sample includes all never married individuals who do not change marital status in Spain, the UK and Ireland. One asterisk 
indicates a 90% confidence level, two indicate 95%, and three indicate 99%. All specifications include country dummies. 
Specifications 3 to 6 also include a dummy for Ireland*Nonreligious. Specifications 5 and 6 also include dummies for 
Married*country, Married*Post, and Ireland*Post*Married. 
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Table 10. Regression results, three-country sample, 4 dependent variables 
 
  1   2   3   4   
Debt 0.0225 ** 0.0377 *** -0.0486 *** -0.0594 *** 
 (0.0096)  (0.0094)  (0.0170)  (0.0169)  
House -0.0244 *** -0.0238 *** 0.0213  0.0224 ** 
 (0.0069)  (0.0042)  (0.0139)  (0.0089)  
Car 0.0205 *** 0.0250 *** 0.0595 *** 0.0487 *** 
 (0.0059)  (0.0030)  (0.0132)  (0.0093)  
2nd house 0.0277 *** 0.0195 *** -0.0153  -0.0090  
 (0.0071)  (0.0057)  (0.0129)  (0.0108)  
         
Control 
group Married, UK and Spain 
Non-rel. mar. in Ireland, married in UK 
and Spain, singles in Ire., UK and Sp. 
Control 
variables 
Age and 
education None  
Age and 
education None  
Specification Linear  LPM w. f-e  Linear  LPM w. f-e  
N 47892   47892   106636   106636   
 
Note: The coefficients reported correspond to the interaction between “post-1996” and 
Ireland in cols. 1 and 2, and Ireland, “post-1996”, “married” and “nonreligious” for cols. 
3 and 4. The married sample includes all couples married before 1996 and never 
separated or divorced in Spain, the UK and Ireland. The singles sample includes all never 
married individuals who do not change marital status in Spain, the UK and Ireland. One 
asterisk indicates a 90% confidence level, two indicate 95%, and three indicate 99%. All 
specifications include country dummies and a dummy for “post-1996”. Specifications 3 
and 4 also include dummies for Ireland*Post, Married*country, Married*Post, and 
Ireland*Post*Married. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
